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Discourse on the quality of civll-military relations in 
the United States has focused on the possible existence of an 
unholy alliance between military organization and industrial 
bureaucracy, dating back to C. Wright Mills' (1956) warning 
us of the power elite and Dwight D. ~isenhower's warning us 
of the military-industrial complex (see for example Pilisuk 
and Hayden, 1965). It is our thesis that differences in 
the nature of interpersonal networks between military and 
civilian arenas and differences between military and 'civilian 
organizational structure preclude the development of a power 
elite as ~ i l i s  saw it. These same factors make military organ- 
ization in the United States unresponsive to public opinion. 
If relations between the military and civilian sectors of 
American society are indeed unholy, they are unholy in ways 
not anticipated by critics of the military-industrial complex. 
THE POWER. ELITE MODEL 
The basic'assumption underlying Mills' formulation was 
that a high degree of interpersonal contact takes place 
among corporation executives, military leaders, and elected 
public officials in both formal and informal settings. These 
three groups of people were purported to come from similar 
social backgrounds, to travel in the same social, circles, and 
to take each other's interests into account in the process 
of making decisions within their own organizational spheres. 
similarity of background would certainly expedite soci- 
ability among these three groups. However, from what we 
know of their backgrounds, they are not all that similar. 
American business leaders tend to be the sons of busi- 
. . 
ness leaders and in general are recruited from the higher 
strata of society. They tend to come from the Middle 
Atlantic, New England, and Pacific Coast states, and are 
likely to'have been born in large urban areas. Most tend 
to be college educated (Warner and Abegglen, 1955). Mili- 
tary leaders also tend to come from high status backgrounds, 
with over half their fathers having been in business and 
the professions (Warner et al, 1963). Military leaders, 
however, are far more likely than corporation officials 
to come from rural areas, and to overrepresent the southern 
states (Janowitz, 1960). In addition, of course, military 
leaders and corporation executives receive their higher 
educations at different institutions, the former being 
preponderantly military academy graduates. Thus, the 
ranking officers of the American armed forces differ from 
their industrial counterparts in terms of urbanization, 
regionalism, and ties to institutions of higher education. 
Although we are not concerned here with differences 
among the civilian elements of the power elite, let us 
note that ' such differences exist. Hacker (1961) , in a 
comparative study of U.S. Senators and corporation presidents, 
noted that while both groups were roughly geographically 
representative, senators tended to have been raised in 
rural areas, while corporation presidents c&ne from urban 
centers. Similarly, although both groups were college 
educated, the corporation executives were more likely 
to have gone to Ivy League schools, while senators were 
more likely to have attended state universities. Hacker 
argues that these background differences lead to disparate 
images of society and a lack of communication between these 
groups. 
THE QUALITY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 
Beyond the differences in social background that exist 
among the groups that are postulated to comprise the power 
elite, our knowledge of human sociability in modern society 
would lead us to question the existence of a military- 
industrial clique as described by Mills. 
In the ideal-typical simple society, individuals do 
not have highly diff@rentiated role sets, and they relate 
to each other as total personalities rather than in the 
context of specific social or economic exchanges. Such 
societies are characterized by high levels of affective 
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investment in one's interpersonal relations (Tennies, 1957). 
In complex modern societies, by contrast, individuals have . 
highly differentiated role sets and relate to others in 
the context of.these roles rather than as total personalities. 
Such relationships tend to be constrained by the temporal and 
spatial limits associated with specific roles. They are 
functionally related to the roles being played, and are 
characterized by relatively low levels of intimacy and 
affect. Such affective neutrality is one of the hallmarks 
of ideal-typical bureaucratic organization. Contemporary 
organization theory suggests that such alienation from 
one's social contacts is even more characteristic of post- 
I bureaucratic society (Bennis and Slater, 1969; Riesman, 
I 
Potter and Watson, 1960). 
There are, of course, arenas of modern life that may 
be characterized by intense primary affective ties, rather 
I than by secondary relationships. The most common of these 
is defined by life-cycle phase. During childhood, roles 
are not highly differentiated. The child has the same 
persons as friends, neighbors, and school-mates, and develops 
deep attachments to them. The ties that4are developed later 
in life with associates who are either neighbors or work-mates 
or fellow club members do not seem to be as intensive, due in 
all likelihood to the differentiation and compartmentalization 
of these roles (Granovetter, 1969). The .weakening of social 
ties with age is reflected in sociometric studies, some of 
which indicate that friendship choices are less likely to be 
reciprocal in older than in younger groups (Laumann, 1969). 
Some sectors of modern adult life are constrained by 
occupational or institutional boundaries in such a way 
that people either do not have highly differentiated role 
sets, or the other people with whom they come into contact 
tend to comprise a constant set regardless of what roles 
they are playing. The former may be exemplified by the 
total institution--the institution that circumscribes the 
totality of the lives of its inhabitants (Goffman, 1961). 
Eoth the boundary conditions and the low level of social 
differentiation in the total institutions discussed by 
Goffman are reminiscent of simple societies and childhood 
peer groups. Were it not for the tendency of their inmates 
to be characterized by affective disorders', we would.antici- 
pate close primary ties among them. 
Certain occupations place similar although less com- 
pulsory constraints on their members, in that they define 
the set of individuals with whom a member is likely to 
associate both on and off the job. Thus, at the very 
least, the roles of friend and workmate are superimposed. 
Lipset, Trow and Coleman (1956) demonstrate that this is 
the case among some typographers. 
'Among the occupational groups that expedite and 
encourage primary relationships, the military profession 
ranks high. Having discovered that it is group cohesion 
rather than ideological commitment that makes effective. 
fighting men (Shils and ~anowitz, 1948), the American 
military services have explicitly set out to build cohesive 
organizational units (cf. Shils, 1950). 
Again, sociometric data are useful in demonstrating 
differences in group cohesion. Davis and Leinhardt (in 
press) analyzed the structure of 30 adult groups and 30 
student groups, selected randomly from an archive of socio- . 
grams, in an effort to test seven predictions regarding 
group structure based upon Homans' (1950) propositions. 
Their data indicate that among the mi1itary:adult groups, 
an average of 5.8 of the 7 predictions per group were 
supported by the data. The corresponding figures for 
the student samples and for the adult non-military samples 
! were 4.97 and 4.76 respectively. That is, the military 
groups conformed more to the bases of subgroup structuring 
anticipated by Homans than even the student groups did, 
age differences notwithstanding. 
An additional indicator of the' degree to which 
military structure is based on primary relations and 
thus differentiated from civilian life is the establish- 
$ ment of "traditions" of military careers within families,. 
Warner et al. (1963) report that 9 per cent of the military 
leaders they studied had fathers in the armed forces at the 
time they themselves entered military service. While only 
a minority of military officers seem to be recruited through 
such ascriptive in-breeding, there.is a higher rate of 
occupational immobility with regard to the military than 
is the case for other sectors of the American labor force. 
In brief,,then, we suggest that'styles of interpersonal 
life differ between the civilian and military arenas. The 
military is characterized by strong affective ties to one's 
fellow-workers, supported in some cases by affective ties 
to the military profession as a family tradition. The 
modern civilian administrator, on the other hand, is not 
strongly tied to his fellow-workers on affective grounds, 
and has only moderately stronger ties to friends and neigh- 
bors who,'unlike military personnel, are unlikely to be 
fellow-woikers . 
The civilian administrator either in the governmental 
or corporate sphere is unlikely to involve himself in a 
highly cohesive power-elite. Such a degree of cohesion is 
foreign to his interpersonal style. The military leader, 
for his part, is unlikely to invest a great deal of affect 
in compartmentalized contacts. His affective ties are 
elsewhere. 
THE BUREAUCRAT VS. THE POST-BUREAUCRAT 
Another aspect of the power-elite model is the inter- 
changeability of personnel between military and civilian 
organization. Clearly, there is no lateral entry of 
members of the political or corporate elites to the upper 
reaches of the military hierarchy. There is some flow of 
personnel in the other direction, but its magnitude is not 
great. Biderman and Sharp (1968) point out that fewer 
than 30 per cent of retired officers work for large business 
establishments, and defense industries make up only one 
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subgroup of such establishments. Moreover, less than 30 
per cent of retired officers are in business and managerial 
positions. It is unlikely that these two sets are totally 
overlapping. Therefore, the number of retired officers 
who assume high level positions in defense industries 
cannot be great. Further, those who do move into the 
industrial structure are unlikely to have the necessary 
skills to reach the highest strata of that structure. 
Segal (1970) has suggested a structural explanation 
for the low level of civil-military managerial inter- 
changeability. On the basis of recent theories of formal 
organization, he suggests that management in the civilian 
context has come to be increasingly professionalized. 
Large corporations have come to be run not by personnel 
who have demonstrated competence with regard to the 
specific product'or service that the organization provides, 
but rather by professional administrators. These men may 
have very little familiarity with the specific production 
processes within their organizations. Rather, they have 
the ability to establish organizational climates within 
which coordination and collaboration are expedited, so 
that "technocrats" can deal with specific operational 
problems. These organizational skills are postulated 
to be transferable among corporate enterprises (Bennis 
and Slater, 1969). 
Military organization, on the other hand, is thought 
to approach more and more closely the bureaucratic model 
(Grusky, 1964). Bureaucratic careers are characterized 
by upward mobility within the organizational structure 
on the basis of demonstrated competence in the provision 
of the product or service that the organization supplies. 
In the case of the military this service is combat, and 
several studies have shown that it is the combat special- 
ists who ascend to the top strata of the ~rnerican military 
hierarchy (Van Riper and Unwalla, 1965). Indeed, if military 
organization in fact requires "generalist" administrative 
skills at the top level as civilian bureaucracies are pur- 
, ported to, then the promotion of officers to general and 
admiral grade on the basis of combat specialist skills may 
be seen as a special case of the Peter Principle, viz., 
military officers are promoted to their own levels of 
, incompetence because the skills on the basis of which 
I 
they are evaluated has nothing to do with the job they are 
expected to perform at the highest levels of the structure 
(cf. Peter and Hull, 1970). 
MODELS OF MILITARY STRUCTURE AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
We have suggested three different models of elite social 
structure in military organization. Each of these models 
. has different implications for the structure of civil-military 
relations at the elite level. The first, which.we may call 
the pre-bureaucratic model, suggests traditionalistic recruit- 
ment bases, and intense affective ties among military personnel. 
We would ant-icipate that careers in such an organization 
would be based on ascriptive non-rational criteria. We 
would expect. such a structure to be associated with a 
military ideology that viewed the military as an active 
and largely autonomous force in the political system 
(Derthick, 1962) . 
The second model is the bureaucratic model, which is 
characterized by a broadened recruitment base, and by careers 
oriented 'toward promotion based upon achievement with regard 
to rational criteria of evaluation. These criteria, in turn, 
are postulated to reflect the mission of the organization: 
in the case of the military, combat expertise. The ideologi- 
cal stance of the ideal-typical bureaucratic military organ- 
ization is one of affective neutrality. We would expect such 
an organization not to be involved in the formulation of 
political decisions, but rather to implement decisions in- 
volving military activity made within the civilian governmental 
structure. 
Finally, we have suggested a post-bureaucratic model of 
organization in which people would be expected to reach the 
top levels of military structure on the basis of organizational 
and administrative skills, rather than combat skills. Because 
of isomorphism with civilian corporate structure, we suggest 
that the military leader qua professional manager would be 
most comfortable in the company of professional colleagues 
who manage corporations in the civilian sector, and would 
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therefore be the most likely type to participate in a 
military-industrial directorate. 
THE UNITED STATES NAVY AS A CASE IN POINT 
Segal (1970) has elsewhere presented data on the Ufiited 
.States Air Force. Since the Air Force is the newest branch 
of the American armed forces and has the most complex technol- 
ogy of th& armed services, it was expected that it would have 
a highly rationalized structure. It was indeed- shown to 
approximate the bureaucratic model, but combat rather than 
administrative skills were shown to be the criteria on 
which promotion to general officer grade and assignment 
to principal command and staff positions were based. 
Previous research suggests that the bureaucratic model 
is a poor one for the United States Navy. Davis (1948) sug- 
gests that although the Navy aspires to a bureaucratic 
structure, it is characterized by buck-passing, excessive 
legalism, insulation from civilian life, and ceremonialism. 
All of these factors mitigate against organizational ration- 
ality. Similarly, Turner (1947) sees certain characteristics 
of the Navy as hindering efficient bureaucratic functioning: 
con£ licts :between regulations and orders from superiors, the 
juxtaposition of rank and role, and the network of informal 
relationships. Indeed, we can conclude from these studies 
that the Navy is at the very least less bureaucratized than 
the Air Force, and therefore less similar in structure to 
civilian corporate organization. The Navy might best be 
characterized as a "mock bureaucracy" (cf. Gouldner, 1954: 
182 ff.). 
There is another sense, however, in which the Navy 
is worthy of our consideration. The Navy is the ranking 
service in terms of the social backgrdund of its officers 
(Janowitz, 1960: 81). Therefore, if any branch of service 
is likely to have social networks that extend into the 
civilian elite, and to promote officers through its hier- 
archy on the basis of their positions in this network, the 
Navy is likely to be that branch. 
DATA 
The homogeneity of the Navy elite in terms of educa- 
tional background, as well as the incidence of managerial 
as against combat skills in this elite is indicated by 
data in'the Navy ~egister. Segal's (1967) data on the 
Navy indicated that in 1951 and 1964, all vice-admirals, 
admirals, and fleet admirals of the United States Navy 
were naval academy graduates. Some non-academy officers 
did attain rear admiral rank. As Table 1 demonstrates, 
our analysis of the educational backgrounds of U. S. Navy 
admirals in 1958, 1962 and 1968 confirms this finding. 
In all three years, all admirals in the top three grades 
were academy graduates. While there is increasing repre- 
sentation of non-academy officers at rear admiral grade, 
Table 1. Per cent of U. S. Navy admirals with academy 
' degrees: 1958, 1962, 1968 
Officer rank % academy N % academy N % academy - - N - .  
Fleet Admiral 100 2 100 - 1 -- - 
Admiral 100 7 10'0 7 100 9 
Vice Admiral 100 30 100 32 100 35 
Rear Admiral' 99 206 98 207 92 212 
Source: United States Navy Register, Adjutant General's 
Office, 1958; Register of Commissioned Officers 
of the United States Navy and Marine Corps and 
Reserve Officers on Active Duty, Adjutant General's 
Office, 1962 and 1968. 
this representatioi is still miniscule. It is clear that no 
old school tie links the Navy elite to the political or economic 
directorate. 
As.a test of the bureaucratic versus professional manage- 
ment models of elite ascent, we coded the training experience 
of U. S. Navy admirals on the basis of whether they.were geared 
'toward administrative or combat training. Our results are pre- 
sented in Table 2. The most dramatic datum in this table is 
the dearth of managerial training among the men who run the 
Navy. No admirals or fleet-admirals in any of the four years 
studied had such training. By 1958, a small percentage of . 
rear admirals had received such training, and the percentage 
has remained relatively constant since, with little indica- 
tion that rear admirals so trained will be promoted to higher 
flag ranks. 
Table 2. Per cent of U. S. Navy admirals with manaqement* or combat** trainins: 1952, 
Rank mngt. cmbt. n mngt. cmbt. - n mngt. cmbt. -. n mngt. cmbt. - n - 
Fleet Admiral - 67 3 - 50 2 - 100 1 - - - 
Admiral - 60 5 - .4 3 7 - 100 7 - . .  . 100 9 - 
Vice Admiral - 70 .23 - 80 30 3 100 32 - 100 35 
Rear Admiral - 67 193 6 76 206 6 92 207 5 95 214 
*Management training: 'post-graduate training in business administration, management, industrial 
engineering, industrial management, naval administration, island govern- 
ment, personnel administration financial management, public administration, . , 
police administration, advertising, commerce, comptrollership, computer w 
systems management, economics and systems analysis, foreign trade, hospi- a I 
tal administration, hotel administration, logistics management, petroleum 
management, procurement management, systems inventory management, trans- 
portation administration. 
**Combat training: destroyer command, naval aviation, submarine duty, submarine command, 
Air Command and Staff School, Air War College, Armed Forces Staff College, 
Army War College, Command and General Staff College, General Line School, 
Imperial Defense College, National War College, Naval War College, Amphibious 
Warfare School, Canadian Defense College, NATO Defense college', United 
Kingdom Joint Services Staff College, French Naval War 'college, Spanish 
Naval War College, Inter-American Defense College, Marine Corps Command 
and Staff College, Royal Naval Staff College, Royal AirForce Staff College, 
German General Staff College, Indian National Defense Service Staff College, 
post-graduate study in weapons systems, nautical science, naval science, 
merchant marine. 
SOURCE: United States Navy Register, Adjutant General's Office, 1952, 1958; Register of Commis- 
sioned Officers of the United States Navy and Marine Corps and ~eserve~fficerso~~ctive 
Duty, Adjutant General's Office, 1962, 1968. 
These figures include all line officers at flag rank for 1952 and 1958. The figures for 1962 and 
1968 include all unrestricted line flag officers. In addition, the following designated categories 
formerly included in general line listings are retained for comparability: (for 1962) engineering 
duty, aeronautical engineering, SDO cryptology, SDO law, SDO intelligence, (for 1968) engineering 
duty, aeronautical engineering, SDO cryptology, naval intelligence, judge advocate general's corps. 
The services not included for any year are: supply corps, corps of civil engineers, TAR, medical 
service, dental service, chaplain service, nurse corps. 
With regard to advanced training in combat skills, on 
the other hand, there is an upward trend at all grades, 
reaching unanimity at all grades above rear .admiral by 1968. 
While not all rear admirals have received in-service 
combat training, the trend is clear at this grade. Sixty-. 
seven per cent of the 1952 cohort of rear admirals had 
' received such training. By 1968 the figure was up to 95 
per cent. Moreover, given the unanimity of combat training 
at the top three flag grades, it would be reasonable to anti- 
cipate that only rear admirals with such training will be 
promoted to those grades in the future. Thus, the skills of 
the ranking admirals of the Navy differ from-those of the 
captains of industry both in their lack of training in admin- 
istrative matters and in their explicit training in activities 
that are overtly disvalued (if covertly cherished) by a civil 
society where the value of human life. is sacred (though not all 
'human lives are equally valued in American society). This fact 
of different training suggests further barriers to civil- 
military elite integration. 
The importance of combat skills for advancement in the 
Navy may be seen more specifically with regard to adaptations 
to aviation technology at flag grade. These data are presented 
in Table 3. While we are dealing here with only one particular 
kind of combat skill, note that by 1968, 40 per cent of the 
rear admirals had aviation training. 
Table 3.' Per cent of U.S. Navy admirals with aviation training: 
1952, 1958, 1962, 1968 
Officer rank aviator N aviator N aviator N aviator N .  - - - -
Fleet admiral -- 3 -- 2 -- 1 -- - 
Admiral 40 5 43 7 57 7 33 9 
vice ~dmiral 35 23 47 30 44 32 43 35 
Rear Admiral 35 193 36 206 39 207 40 212 
Source: United States Navy Register, 1952 and 1958; Register 
of Commissioned Officers of the United States Navy and 
Marine Corps, and Reserve Officers on Active Duty, 1962 
and 1968. 
Implicit in our earlier discussion was an expectation that 
the Navy would be characterized by a traditionalistic pre- 
bureaucratic command structure. Our data, however, suggest 
that the Navy might be described by the same model that fits 
the non-traditional and highly technologized U. S. Air Force: 
a bureaucratic model in which promotion to the top strata of 
the hierarchy is based upon mission-oriented skills. 
DISCUSSION 
We have suggested three ideal-typical models of struc- 
tural modernity for military organizations. ' Each model is 
characterized-by skill distributions and styles of interper- 
sonal relations .that have implications for the development 
of a military-industrial power elite. 
We had anticipated finding the pre-bureaucratic model 
to most closely describe the structure of the U. S. Navy. 
Our analysis of the formal training experiences associated 
with mobility through the Navy hierarchy to flag grade, 
however, suggests that the bureaucratic model may fit best. 
Military family traditionalism, of course, is likely to 
create some deviations in a pre-bureaucratic direction. 
The bureaucratic structure of military organization 
poses two major obstacles to the formation of a military- 
industrial cabal. First, the academy-trained and combat 
oriented military bureaucrat has little in common with the 
professional civilian executive, in terms of either back- 
ground or interest. Second, one of the characteristics 
of bureaucratic organization is the maintenance of a posture 
of ethical neutrality. 
The assumption of ethical neutrality does not preclude 
the military officer from valuing military activity posi- 
tively, or from viewing warfare as a reasonable way to 
conduct foreign affairs. It should, however, prevent the 
military from being the strongest pro-war lobby, while 
contributing to the development of a political environment 
that nurtures sentiments of belligerence originating in 
other quarters.. 
Our basic position is in agreement with that of Admiral 
Hyman ~ickover, who feels that the'military isn't a contribut- 
ing partner to a "military-industrial complex," but rather is 
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an agency that is used to the economic advantage of certain 
sectors- of American industry. We similarly agree (if not 
sympathize) with corporation executives who feel that they 
should get top billing, viz., that social s'cientists and 
journalists should speak about the industrial-military 
complex, although they are probably still overstating the 
role of the military. 
We concur with Fusfeld's (1968) analysis, which 
traces America's willingness to engage in foreign wars 
to the corporations that profit from those wars. T h e  
magnitude of federal monies spent on the mi1itary.i~ £re- 
quently cited as evidence of the existence of a military- 
industrial complex. If indeed military expenditures repre- 
sent 15 per cent of American GNP, as Fusfeld estimates, we 
view this as the best evidence that it is private corpora- 
tions, rather than the military, that reap the spoils of war. 
This is not a uniform indictment of the American corporate 
structure. We,know that some industries, notably ordnance, 
aerospace, - primary metals and marine transportation stand to 
lose the most if peace breaks out (see Leontief and Hoffenberg, 
1961). Others, such as construction, stand to gain. In the 
aggregate, however, the costs of war seem to be carried most 
by the consumer, who has trouble buying butter when the govern-. 
ment is buying guns, and only secondarily by the butter- 
producing industries (cf. Russett, 1969). 
-20-  
Another bit of evidence frequently cited for the existence 
of a military-industrial complex is that some high ranking 
military offi'cers do indeed move into corporate positions after 
retirement. We have argued above that the magnitude of such 
mobility is small, and that the officers who make such moves 
are unlikely to have the necessary skills to reach the top 
of the corporate hierarchy. There are other points to consider 
.as well. 
Perhaps most often overlooked' is the fact that the earlier 
an officer terminates his military career to enter civilian 
industry, the lower his military rank when he leaves. Even 
those officers who leave-after 20  or 25 years of service 
are far more likely to be,colonels or brigadier generals 
than they are to be major generals or generals. Thus, such 
mobility 'does not move military elites into civilian industry, 
although it may provide linkages between civilian and military 
elites to the extent that the colonels who enter industry 
were academy class-mates and friends of the generals and 
admirals who remain in the military. The crucial point, 
however, is that it is - not the military elites who are moving 
into civilian indu'stry. 
A second point is that the concentration of economic 
power in the United States has been attributed largely to 
interlocking directorates among banks and large corporations. 
The military is not directly involved in these networks of 
interlocks. While occasionally retired high ranking military 
officers may be appointed to the boards of directors of 
large corporations and may use friendships with the 
"military direc'torate" in the interest of their corpora- 
tions., what is important here is that such activity takes 
place.after the completion of the military career of the 
person involved. Thus, military participation is through 
cooptation, not cooperation. 
These structural factors notwithstanding, the military 
has been identified by the antiwar movement in the United 
States as the primary evil in the military-industrial 
complex. Far more of the movements' resources have been 
aimed at severing university relations with the Reserved 
Officers  raining Corps (R.O.T.C.), preventing universities 
from accepting Department of Defense research contracts 
and grants, interfering with military recruiting, demonstrat- 
ing in and around armed forces installations, and harassing 
the Selective Service than with protesting the role of pri- 
vate corporations in the war effort. While such protests . . 
have occurred -(as in the case of Dow stockholders who 
objected to the manufacture of napalm or the relatively 
isolated instances of harassment of industrial recruiters) 
demonstrations against private corporations in the United 
States are far more likely to be rooted in policies regarding 
pollution or discrimination against minority group members and 
women in employment than they are to confront the issue of 
war profiteering. 
This focus on the military has at least two important 
consequences for American society. First, by channeling 
the resources of the antiwar movement away from what we 
see as the true economic impetus of American military 
activity, it probably extends the life of military operations, 
rather than hastening their demise. 
Secondly, the success that the antiwar movement has 
experienced in moving R.O.T.C. units off campuses and in 
opposing conscription has placed restrictions in the input 
of civilian sensitivities into the armed forces. We concur 
with Moscos' (1970) observation that as the military becomes 
increasingly separated from civilian society, greater latitude 
for international irresponsibility on the part of civilian 
leaders is a consequence that may.be anticipated. 
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